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Biased technological change is introduced via embodied technical progress and a capital-skill
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The rise in unemployment observed in many European countries over the last decades has been
particularly strong among low-skilled workers. One possible interpretation for these uneven
changes in unemployment changes is biased technological change. If investment in new tech-
nologies raises the relative demand for skilled workers1, low-skilled unemployment increases
unless the variation in relative demands is compensated by a change in relative wages or in rela-
tive labor supplies. Biased technological change combined with relative wage rigidities may thus
lead to “skill mismatch” and thereby, to higher low-skilled unemployment rates (see table 1).
However, more and more attention has recently been paid to an alternative explanation in terms
of job competition. If high-skilled workers compete with low-skilled ones for low-skilled jobs,
but the opposite is not true, purely aggregate shocks can have strong asymmetric unemployment
eﬀects by generating a so-called ladder eﬀect. The interest for this alternative view has arisen
from the observation that all unemployment rates have increased, while a biased technological
change should a priori decrease unemployment of high-skilled workers, at least if wage-wage
interactions are not too strong.
In many OECD countries, investment in human capital (education) has signiﬁcantly increased
despite a stable wage premium (see for instance Muysken and ter Weel (1999)). Youngsters
invest more in human capital not because the relative wage for high-skilled on complex jobs has
increased, but rather because a higher education level increases the number of job opportunities.
Recent empirical work suggest that the proportion of “overqualiﬁed” workers is far from neg-
ligible although hard to evaluate. Hartog (2000) collects empirical results from various studies
about the level of job competition (“overeducation”) in several EU countries. Depending on the
methodology used and the country surveyed, this overeducation is estimated to be between 10%
and 30% during the ﬁrst half of the nineties. Moreover, they also show that overeducation in-
creased over the last decades (except in UK). Forgeot and Gauti´ e (1997) report that, in France,
the proportion of overeducated workers has strongly increased between 1986 and 1995, partic-
1There is wide evidence suggesting that technological progress may have substantially increased the relative
demand for skilled workers (see for instance Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Berman, Bound, and Griliches
(1994), or Machin, Ryan, and Van Reenen (1998)).
1ularly among women and young workers looking for a ﬁrst job. Following their study, between
1986 and 1995 the proportion of French workers with an university diploma being overqualiﬁed
in their job increased from 6.6% to 18.7%. Moreover, in 1995, more than 24% of young women
were overqualiﬁed.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES RELATIVE WAGES
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2001 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995
France 3.9 9.1 10.7 D5/D9 51.7 50.8 50.3
D1/D5 60.6 61.5 60.9
Germany 1.4 5.2 7.3 D5/D9 60.8 61.0 61.4
D1/D5 60.0 64.4 67.4
Japan 1.7 2.5 3.4 D5/D9 55.9 54.4 53.9
D1/D5 58.2 58.5 60.4
United Kingdom 4.3 10.0 6.8 D5/D9 58.2 55.5 53.9
D1/D5 59.0 56.8 55.9
United States 6.2 7.2 5.5 D5/D9 .. .. 48.4
D1/D5 .. .. 48.1
D5/D9: ratio of the upper earnings limit of the ﬁfth decile of workers to the upper limit of the ninth decile. D1/D5: ratio
of the upper earnings limit of the ﬁrst decile of workers to the upper limit of the ﬁfth decile.
Source concerning unemployment rates: For France, Japan, United Kingdom and United States we use LABORSTA
database, from the International Labor Oﬃce. The data concerning Germany comes from the OECD Economic Outlook.
Source concerning relative wages: OECD Employment Outlook 1996 chapter 3. For Germany we have information only
between 1983-1993. For U.S. data concerns only the 1993-1995 period.
Table 1: Average unemployment rates and relative wages in ﬁve OECD countries (in percent).
Several theoretical models have been constructed and calibrated to examine this issue. Gautier
(2002) develops a stylized partial equilibrium model with two types of jobs and two types of
workers and wage bargaining. He focuses on the stationary state properties of the model and
emphasizes the diversity of eﬀects that can be obtained as a result of the externalities introduced
via the matching function. Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno (2000) use a similar approach with
a simpler albeit more realistic representation of wage determination to provide a quantitative
analysis of the Spanish case. They calibrate a stationary equilibrium model to evaluate the job
competition eﬀect triggered by the dramatic increase in the proportion of skilled workers that
took place in the late eighties. Similar models are also considered in Albrecht and Vroman (2002)
and Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2002). Collard, Fonseca, and Mu˜ noz (2002) provide a ﬁrst
attempt to include this type of quantitative analysis in a dynamic general equilibrium setup.
2Pierrard and Sneessens (2002) use a similar setup with on-the-job search and endogenous search
intensities for high-skilled workers so as to obtain a less mechanical job competition eﬀect. Their
model is able to explain a signiﬁcant part of the unemployment rise observed in Belgium over the
last twenty years by simply changing two parameters: the relative productivity of high-skilled
workers and the proportion of high-skilled workers in the total labor force. They furthermore
examine the interactions between skill mismatch and job competition. Although the proportion
of overqualiﬁed workers they obtain is relatively low, job competition contributes signiﬁcantly
to the overall increase in low-skilled unemployment.
One of the main diﬃculties in these models is to account simultaneously for the three main styl-
ized facts observed in many EU countries since the mid-seventies: (i) the increase in the overall
unemployment rate; (ii) the diﬀerence between high-skilled and low-skilled unemployment; (iii)
the stability of relative wages. This paper focuses on these issues. It builds on Pierrard and
Sneessens (2002). Compared to their model, our contribution is threefold. Instead of assuming
that low-skilled wages are indexed on high-skilled ones, we allow separate wage bargaining for
all workers. Second, by endogenizing search intensities of low-skilled workers we are able to
capture a kind of discouragement eﬀect understood as a decrease in search intensity rather than
as duration concept (there is no duration in our model). Finally, we introduce biased technolog-
ical change as the result of embodied technical progress (deﬁned as the technological progress
only aﬀecting new investment goods) with capital-skill complementarity. Concerning techno-
logical progress, authors like Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel (2002) or Mairesse, Cette,
and Kocoglu (2000) ﬁnd that it has become increasingly incorporated in new capital goods, i.e.
if a ﬁrm wants to beneﬁt from a technological improvement embodied in a particular capital
good it has no other choice but buying that good. Regarding the capital-skill complementary
relationship, many empirical studies (see Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Fitz Roy and
Funke (1995), Machin, Ryan, and Van Reenen (1998), Krusell et al. (2000) or Moreno-Galbis
(2002)) point to the importance of this relationship. The model presented in this paper repro-
duces quite well the three stylized facts mentioned above. Furthermore we obtain a signiﬁcant
discouragement eﬀect (decrease in search intensity) for low-skilled workers induced by the lower
demand for simple jobs. This reinforces the job competition eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. We describe labor market
3ﬂows, workers and ﬁrms behaviors, and wage bargaining. In section 3 we calibrate the model
on Belgian data for 1996. We examine the properties of the model by simulating its responses
to various types of shocks. We next set the technological and labor force composition variables
to their 1976 values and check the ability of the model to reproduce the stylized facts. Finally
we analyze the eﬀects of various policy measures. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The structure of the model is based on an earlier work by Pierrard and Sneessens (2002).
The economy consists of two broad categories of agents, ﬁrms and households. We distinguish
two types of households; each type is deﬁned by the skill level (high or low) of its members.
All members of a household supply inelastically one unit of labor; they may be employed or
unemployed2.
We distinguish three types of ﬁrms: two types of intermediate good ﬁrms, producing respectively
high- and low-tech intermediate goods with labor as sole input, and one representative ﬁnal ﬁrm,
combining capital and the two intermediate goods to produce an homogeneous ﬁnal good. The
ﬁnal good can be used for consumption or capital accumulation. The production of high-tech
intermediate goods involves complex tasks that can only be carried out by high-skilled workers.
The production of low-tech intermediate goods consists of simpler tasks that can be carried out
by both high- or low-skilled workers. There is thus a double heterogeneity as in Gautier (Gautier
2002): heterogeneity of jobs (complex vs simple) and heterogeneity of workers (high- vs low-
skilled).
There are three types of markets: labor, goods and capital. On the labor side, we distinguish
between the complex and the simple job markets, where the complex jobs can only be occupied by
high-skilled workers and simple jobs by both high- and low-skilled workers. For each type of job,
we assume an exogenous job destruction rate and represent the matching process by a standard
matching function (Cobb-Douglas). Because they know that their application will always be
2The representative household formulation amounts to assuming that workers of a given group are perfectly
insured against their own individual unemployment risk. This simpliﬁcation is common in the literature and is
needed to keep the model tractable.
4turned down, low-skilled job seekers never apply for complex jobs. High-skilled unemployed
workers may look for both types of jobs. Furthermore, the set of parameter values adopted
in the model guarantees the absence of corner solutions, i.e. there is always a number of
high-skilled workers in simple jobs. High-skilled workers hired on a simple job may continue
searching for a complex job (on-the-job search). Low-skilled unemployed workers may search
more or less intensively for a simple job, depending on its attractiveness compared to home
production. All good markets (the two intermediate goods and the ﬁnal good markets) are
assumed to be perfectly competitive. The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to one. On the
capital market, the supply is determined by the stock of capital previously accumulated by the
household (as explained in section 2.5 all capital stock is owned by the high-skilled household).
The interest rate adjusts to make the quantity demanded by the representative ﬁnal ﬁrm equal
to this predetermined capital stock.
Labor market ﬂows are detailed in the following subsection. Next we successively discuss the
behaviors of the intermediate and ﬁnal ﬁrms, the mechanisms of biased technological change and
capital accumulation, the behaviors of high- and low-skilled households and, ﬁnally, the wage
determination processes.
2.1 Labor market ﬂows
Let Nc
t and Ns
t represent total employment in complex and simple jobs, respectively. Simple
jobs can be occupied by high- (Nsh
t ) or low-skilled (Nsl




Normalizing the total labor force to one and denoting by ® the exogenous3 proportion of high-




t = ®; and Nsl
t + Ul
t = 1 ¡ ®; (1)
where Uh
t and Ul
t denote the number of high- and low-skilled unemployed job-seekers respectively.
Let the number of complex and simple job matches be denoted by Mc
t and Ms
t respectively.
We assume that the number of such matches is a function of the number of corresponding job
vacancies (V c
t and V s
t ) and eﬀective job seekers (the number of job seekers weighted by their
3An endogenous ® would require the model to consider human capital formation and education issues, which
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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where sct, sot, sht and slt stand for the search eﬃciency of each type of job seeker. Both
functions are assumed to be linear homogeneous (Cobb-Douglas). We assume that every period,
both the high- and the low-skilled unemployed workers spend a certain amount of time having
what we call an active life. In other words, every period, a constant fraction of time is spent
on searching for a job or doing other productive activities (in our case, domestic production),
while the rest of the time is devoted to non-productive activities (such as sleeping, eating, etc.).
We assume that the amount of time spent in active life is the same for high- and low-skilled
workers, and we normalize it to one.
Given the conditions prevailing on the labor market (wages, probabilities to ﬁnd jobs, ...), a high-
skilled unemployed allocates its active time between searching for a complex job (0 · eht · 1)
and searching for a simple job (0 · 1¡eht · 1). Since the worker knows that he has a positive
probability of being hired in any of the two types of jobs and it is always more proﬁtable to be
occupied in a complex or a simple job rather than to stay at home doing domestic activities, the
high-skilled worker spends all his active time searching in both labor market segments. High-
skilled on simple jobs spend a fraction (0 · eot · 1) of their leisure time (normalized to 1)
searching for a complex job. Besides, a low-skilled unemployed splits his active time between
searching for a job in the simple segment (0 · elt · 1) and staying at home doing domestic
activities (0 · 1 ¡ elt · 1). Because they know that their application will always be turned
down, low-skilled job seekers never apply for complex jobs, so when they are not looking for a job
in the simple segment, they simply stay at home doing domestic activities. We have, therefore,
an asymmetry in the behavior of high- and low-skilled workers that results from the asymmetry
between complex jobs, which can only be occupied by high-skilled workers, and simple jobs,
which can be occupied by both types of workers. Search eﬃciencies, sot, sct, sht and slt are
concave and increasing functions of the search eﬀorts, eot, eht, 1 ¡ eht and elt, respectively.
We deﬁne labor market tensions as the ratio between the number of vacancies and the number
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: (3)
With linear homogeneous matching functions, the probabilities pc
t and ps
t of ﬁnding a complex














































The probability that a simple job is ﬁlled is the sum of the probabilities of hiring a high-skilled


















Finally, we assume two exogenous job destruction rates, Âc (for the complex jobs) and Âs (for the
simple jobs), which implies for each type of job and worker the following employment dynamics
(in terms of vacancies and job-seekers’ search eﬀort respectively):
Nc

































Figure 1 summarizes these labor market ﬂows and transition probabilities. Armed with these








« on-the-job-search » Nsh
Figure 1: Labor market ﬂows and transition probabilities.
2.2 Intermediate ﬁrms
We use the standard one-job-one-ﬁrm representation. Each intermediate ﬁrm can open either a





t ). The cost of opening a complex vacancy equals vc
t per period. A ﬁlled
complex job produces each period one unit of complex intermediate good sold at a price cc
t; the
wage paid to the worker is denoted wc
t. The asset values of the vacant and ﬁlled complex jobs
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where ˜ ¯t+1 is the ﬁrm’s discount factor (deﬁned in section 2.5).
Simple job vacancies can be ﬁlled with either a high-skilled or a low-skilled worker. The two
workers may however have diﬀerent productivity. Let WV
Ns
t denote the asset value of a vacant
simple job. The asset value of a ﬁlled simple job will be denoted WF
Nsh
t
when ﬁlled by a high-
skilled worker and WF
Nsl
t
when ﬁlled by a low-skilled worker. Let vs
t denote the vacancy cost
per period, cs
t the selling price, wsh
t and wsl
t the wage paid to the high- and low-skilled worker
4The asset value is equal to the discounted value of all expected current and future proﬁts. This value is, of
course, diﬀerent for a ﬁrm with a ﬁlled or a vacant job.

























































where the parameter º allows diﬀerent productivity levels for high- and low-skilled workers (º
may a priori be larger or smaller than unity). We ﬁnally assume the usual free entry conditions





t = 0: (19)
2.3 Final ﬁrm
The representative ﬁnal ﬁrm uses capital (Kt), complex and simple intermediate goods (Qc
t and
Qs

























t is the usage cost of capital, while cc
t and cs
t stand, respectively, for the price of complex








where FXt stands for the ﬁrst derivative of F with respect to Xt. In the rest of the paper, we


















t = 1 ; (22)
where z represents total factor productivity and 1 ¡ ¹ is the capital share. As discussed below,
we allow the productivity coeﬃcients, µc
t and µs
t, of the two intermediate inputs to vary over







9so that changes in the values of µc
t and µs
t induce changes in the marginal productivity (in value
added terms) of complex and simple jobs respectively.
2.4 Skill-Bias
The empirical evidence reveals that the use of new technologies is associated to an increased
relative demand for skilled labor, as a result of either technological requirements (see Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994) for an example on the U.S. economy and Machin, Ryan, and
Van Reenen (1998) for European countries) or induced organizational changes (see for instance
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002)). This suggests
that the change in the demand for skilled labor should best be seen as a result from a combination
of embodied technological progress and capital-skill complementarity. The empirical relevance
of these two aspects has been emphasized by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel (2002) or
Mairesse, Cette, and Kocoglu (2000) for embodied technological progress and by Berman, Bound,
and Griliches (1994), Krusell et al. (2000), Lindquist (2004) or Machin, Ryan, and Van Reenen
(1998), among others, for capital-skill complementarity. In line with this empirical literature,
we consider that the change in the relative demand for high-skilled workers is associated to
embodied technological progress.
We model the embodiment process by allowing new investment goods to be more productive
than older ones, which is simple to formalize and, at the same time, seems quite intuitive.
Following Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002), we write the law of motion of capital5 as:
Kt+1 ¡ Kt = et It ¡ ± Kt ; 0 < ± < 1 ; (24)
where It denotes investment expenditures and ± is the exogenous depreciation rate of capital.
The variable et is an index measuring the marginal contribution of investment expenditures to
the aggregate capital stock (it stands for the embodied technological progress). The term 1=et
is interpreted as the relative price of new capital goods. The increase in the decline rate of the
relative price of new capital goods over the last 30 years can thus be attributed to an increase
in the importance of embodied technological progress, i.e. a rise in et implies a fall in 1=et.
5Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002) show that this simple representation can be obtained from an
explicit vintage model.
10We represent this type of embodied technical progress by a simple learning-by-doing (LBD)
process (Arrow (1962)), i.e. the productivity of the capital goods sector, measured by et, is a
positive function of the size of that sector, measured by Kt:
et = e0 K
°
t ; ° ¸ 0 ; (25)
where e0 is the scale parameter and ° measures the eﬃciency of the LBD process. Equations
(24) and (25) describe this process: for each unit of ﬁnal good invested in period t, we obtain
et > et¡1 units of capital. These productivity gains generated by the LBD lead to lower capital
good prices, which stimulates investment, increases the total capital stock, and (via the learning
process described in equation (25)) leads to further productivity gains. This process comes to
an end when these productivity gains (∆et) are more than compensated by the decrease in the
marginal productivity of capital (∆FKt).
The complementarity relationship between capital and skills is introduced by allowing the use







t ; a1 ¸ 0 : (26)
An upturn in et (either coming from an increase in the learning eﬃciency, °, or from a more
important capital accumulation) improves the productivity of new investment goods and com-
plex intermediate goods (which stimulates the relative demand for high-skilled labor). This
speciﬁcation endogenizes the observed complementarity between new technologies and skilled
labor and keeps the Cobb-Douglas production function framework supported by the aggregate
evidence and used in most dynamic macro models6.
2.5 Households
The household decisions bear on consumption and savings and on job search intensities. To avoid
untractable ex post heterogeneity issues, most general equilibrium models with search assume
6Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) estimate a production function with two types of labor for several OECD
countries and conclude that the Cobb-Douglas hypothesis cannot be rejected; biased technical progress takes the
form of an exogenous change in the productivity coeﬃcients. The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation is also motivated
in the RBC literature by the observation that the capital share remains stable in the long run.
11that workers are perfectly insured against individual unemployment risks. Assuming a large
representative household is a simple way of introducing such an assumption. For our purpose,
it is important though to distinguish at least two types of households, a high- and a low-skilled
household. Employment probabilities and expected wage incomes are quite diﬀerent for high-
and low-skilled workers. This will aﬀect their search behaviors, as well as the negotiated wages.
To simplify we assume that the whole capital stock is owned by the high-skilled (high-income)
household. This amounts to assuming that the low-skilled household consumes its current income
in every period.
The representative high-skilled household
The members of the high-skilled household can be either unemployed, employed on a complex
job getting paid a wage wc
t, or employed on a simple job getting paid a wage wsh
t . The decision
variables of the household are the consumption level of each of its members and the amount
of time devoted to job search for those who are unemployed or employed on a low-paid simple
job. We assume that unemployed job seekers devote all their free time (normalized to unity) to
search; they choose the fraction of this time, eht, that will be devoted to the complex market.
Similarly, workers on a simple job devote a fraction, eot, of their leisure time to “on-the-job
search”. The optimization problem of the representative high-skilled household can be written
































Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt
´
+ Ch
t + Tt: (28)
WH
t is a function of the initial values of the three state variables Kt;Nc
t ;Nsh
t ; U(:) is an increasing
and concave function of per capita consumption (Ch
t measures thus the total consumption of the
high-skilled household); D(:) is an increasing and convex function of the amount of leisure time
devoted to on-the-job search; ¯ is a psychological discount factor. The resources of the high-
skilled household include wage incomes, an unemployment beneﬁt wu
t , the rents from capital
12plus the proﬁts Πt redistributed by the intermediate goods ﬁrms. Investment expenditures
are equal to net capital accumulation times the relative price of new capital goods 1=et (see
(24)). Tt represents a lump-sum tax levied on the high-skilled household to ﬁnance government
expenditures.
Let us deﬁne rt as the net interest rate measured in units of capital7. More precisely:
rt = ck
t :et ¡ ± : (29)
Let us also deﬁne the asset values (from the high-skilled household’s point of view) of an addi-






















respectively. The ﬁrst-order optimality conditions can then be written as follows:
UCh













t sceht ˜ ¯t+1 WH
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t+1 ¡ ps




















where the discount factor ˜ ¯t+1 is deﬁned by:










where FKt stands for the marginal productivity of capital and c
K
t for the capital usage cost. We should keep in
mind, however, that the marginal productivity of capital, FKt, is deﬁned in terms of ﬁnal goods, while the rate
of return to investors is deﬁned in terms of capital goods. The relative price of the latter is 1=et. Hence, the
marginal cost of capital, c
K
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The representative low-skilled household
While high-skilled unemployed workers can search for a job on both the complex and the simple
job markets, low-skilled unemployed workers have only the choice between searching for a simple
job or doing some “domestic production”. By assumption, the low-skilled household accumulates
no capital. Its sole decision variable is the fraction of time elt that the unemployed worker devotes
to job search rather than to domestic activities. Its optimization problem can thus be written






























t is a function of the initial value of the state variable Nsl
t , Cl
t is the total amount consumed
by the low-skilled household and yd
t is the productivity of unemployed workers on domestic ac-
tivities.










where ˆ ¯t+1 = ¯ UCl
t+1=UCl



































There are three types of matches (high-skilled worker on a complex or a simple job; low-skilled
worker on a simple job). We assume that the wage rate is in each case determined at the
beginning of every period by a Nash bargaining between the intermediate good ﬁrm and its


































where ´i for i = c, sh, sl, represent the workers’ bargaining power.
3 Model calibration and simulations
In this section we calibrate the model and use deterministic simulation exercises to illustrate
the properties of the model and gain insights on the eﬀects of various types of shocks. The
emphasis will be on the eﬀects of labor force composition and biased technological changes and
their interactions with “institutional” settings over the period 1976-1996.
3.1 Speciﬁcation and calibration
The matching function on each job market is represented by the usual Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation























for complex and simple jobs respectively. The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the matching
process is quite standard in the literature since it is mathematically simply to deal with and
it seems to provide a good approximation of the real matching process (see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001)). We follow Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) and use also a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas function with three inputs to represent the technological constraint faced
by the representative ﬁnal ﬁrm (see equations (22) and (23)). The skill-biased change is seen
15as the consequence of embodied technological progress and capital-skill complementarity (see
equations (25) and (26)). As in many RBC models, we represent the instantaneous utility
of consumption by the logarithm of consumption expenditures. The leisure cost of on-the-job
search is proportional to the amount of time spent and home productivity is assumed to be
equal to a fraction Ã of aggregate productivity. More formally:




















1 ¡ eht (48)





elt Low-skilled unemployed search eﬃciency (49)













The parameters of the model are whenever possible set to values compatible with the available
empirical evidence. The parameters for which no empirical estimates are available are chosen
so as to reproduce the situation observed in Belgium8 in the mid nineties (1996). As most EU
countries, the Belgian economy was then neither in a recession nor in a boom. In terms of
employment performance, the Belgian economy is in the EU average and quite representative of
a typical “European” economy.
The numerical values of the parameters are reported in table 2. The reference period is the
quarter. The elasticity of output with respect to capital coincides with the capital share in total
8All through the paper we assume a closed economy, while Belgium is an open economy. The assumption can
thus be thought as being restrictive. However, extending the model to an open economy would not improve its
explicative power on unemployment issues and would complicate the analysis, especially because the interest rate
would be externally ﬁxed.
16Symbol Value Symbol Value
Production z 1 ¹ 0.66
º 1.00 ± 0.025
e0 1.00 ° 0.071
a0 0.42 a1 10.2
Labor force composition ® 0.67
Preferences ¯ 0.99 ¿ 0.30













Matching eﬃciencies mc 0.38 ¸c 0.50
ms 0.38 ¸s 0.50
Bargaining power ´c 0.50




Job destruction rates Âc 0.03 Âs 0.05
Average replacement ratio bu 0.34
Table 2: Numerical parameter values (year of reference: 1996).
income; it is set to the standard value 1¡¹ = 0:33 used in the RBC literature. The depreciation
rate ± is set to 2.5%. We assume that high- and low-skilled workers are equally productive on
simple jobs (º = 1). This particular choice has little impact on the predictions of the model.
We ﬁx the parameters describing the embodied technical progress so as to reproduce the change
in the relative price of investment goods observed in Belgium during the period 1976-1996. We
normalize the relative price to unity in 1976 (that is, e0=1 and ° = 0 in 1976) and set the 1996
value of ° to 0:0705 (implying et = 1:23 in 1996). The eﬀects of embodied technical progress
on the relative demand for high- and low-skilled workers are determined by the values of the
parameters a0 and a1. These values are chosen so as to reproduce the 1976 and 1996 values of
the Cobb-Douglas coeﬃcients ¹µc and ¹µs reported in Sneessens and Shadman (2000).
We deﬁne the high-skilled group by an educational attainment level at least equal to a upper-
secondary degree and set ® = 0:67, the 1996 value reported by Sneessens and Shadman (2000)
17for Belgium. As in most RBC models, consumers’s psychological discount factor ¯ is set to
0.99, implying a steady state real interest rate of 0.01 (real interest rate of 4% per annum).
The domestic productivity parameter Ã is ﬁxed at 0.17 (i.e. the domestic productivity of a
low-skilled worker is equal to 17% of the average aggregate productivity), a value which seems
reasonable and gives a realistic relative wage (wsl=wc = 62%, a value close to the relative mean
gross wage of the 33% lowest-paid full-time workers (see OECD (1996)).
Our representation of the wage determination process remains of course simpliﬁed compared to
the complexity of the Belgian system. In Belgium, there are three levels of wage negotiation:
the intra-sectoral (national) level, the sectoral level and the individual level. Every two years,
negotiations at the intra-sectoral level determine the legal minimum wage, as well as the “wage
norm”. More regularly, wage negotiations are also held within the diﬀerent economic sectors
where the legal minimum wage and the wage norm are taken respectively as the lower and upper
bounds. Eventually, wages may, at each period, be (re)negotiated at the individual level. As a
consequence, in 1995, only 2% of Belgian workers were paid at the legal minimum wage. This
small percentage remains coherent with the quantitative results presented in this paper. More
precisely, following Joseph, Pierrard, and Sneessens (2004) we ﬁx the net Katz index (deﬁned
as the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage) to 0.58, so that we obtain for 1996 a
minimum wage of 0.7. This value is bigger than the value associated to domestic activities,
meaning that it is always in the interest of a low-skilled worker to accept a job paid at the
legal minimum wage rather than staying at home. On the other side, we realize that the wage
earned in simple jobs equals 0.8, and whatever the shocks we introduce, it never falls below the
minimum wage (probably due to the rigidity introduced by the presence of an indexed domestic
productivity).
We have four search intensity equations, two for each segment of the labor market. We impose
identical parameter values for a given segment, which leaves four values to ﬁx. The simple job
market search intensity coeﬃcients have been chosen so as to normalize low-skilled workers’
search intensity to unity in 1976 and have a sensitivity to labor market tightness in the order
of magnitude estimated by Patacchini and Zenou (2003) (around 0.3). The complex market
search intensity coeﬃcients, the disutility parameter ¿, the two matching eﬃciency parameters
18and the vacancy cost parameters (vc
0 and vs
0) are given values to reproduce the 1996 values of
the high- and low-skilled unemployment rates (6.8% and 20.1%, respectively), the probabilities
of ﬁlling a vacant complex or simple job (qc
t and qs
t, around 0.4; see Delmotte, Hootegem, and
Dejonckheere (2001)) and the probabilities of ﬁnding a complex or a simple job (values ps
t and
pc
t such that the probability to ﬁnd a job is around 20% for a low-skilled worker and 40% for
a high-skilled-worker; see Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004)). Our calibration of vc
0 and vs
0 implies
that total vacancy costs represent 3.5% of output in the reference simulation.
We follow most authors and set the parameter determining the worker’s share in a match surplus
equal to the coeﬃcient of unemployment in the matching function (see for instance Merz (1995)
and Andolfatto (1996))9. The latter is set at 0.5, a value obtained in many empirical estimates
of the Cobb-Douglas matching function (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)) and that provides
reasonable results in our simulations. Calibrations for the average replacement ratio10 (bu =
34%) and the two job destructions rates (Âc = 3% and Âs = 5%) are based on estimations by
Van der Linden and Dor (2001) for the Belgian economy. A result of this calibration exercise
is that the proportion of high-skilled workers in simple jobs equals 7.3%. Even if this result
contrasts with the 24% job competition eﬀect found in Denolf, Denys, and Simoens (2001) for
the Belgian economy, we must not forget that our theoretical setup considers job competition
only between two groups of workers: high- and low-skilled. However, as pointed by Cockx and
Dejemeppe (2004), the competition is probably more intense inside groups. Our ladder eﬀect
under-estimates thus the true job competition eﬀect.
3.2 Technological shocks, labor force composition and unemployment
We examine the steady state eﬀects of three diﬀerent types of shocks in order to test the
properties of the model11. First, we consider a change in labor force composition (an increase
9This choice is typically motivated by the so-called Hosios-Pissarides eﬃciency condition. It is worth noting
that in our setup with job competition this condition may not be suﬃcient to ensure eﬃciency.
10The replacement ratio is deﬁned as the relationship between the unemployment beneﬁts and the average labor
income.
11To test the robustness of the results, we verify that the variation of every endogenous variable keeps the same
sign whatever the size of the shock introduced on the particular exogenous variable. The ﬁnal size of each shock
is chosen in order to be as reasonable as possible with what seems realistic.
19in the proportion of high-skilled in the total labor force, ®). Next we look at two diﬀerent
types of productivity shock (aggregate technological shock, z, and embodied technical shock,
°). Moreover we implement a historical comparison simulation about Belgian unemployment
rates and relative wages. The results12 for the long-run eﬀects are summarized in tables 3 to 6.
We brieﬂy comment each exercise.
Labor force composition
A rise in the proportion of high-skilled workers in the total labor force (®) increases the prob-
ability to ﬁll a complex job, and thus stimulates the opening of complex vacancies. The higher
number of complex jobs improves the marginal productivity of simple jobs, increasing simple
wages and stimulating search eﬀort of low-skilled workers (elt).
Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Ladder
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect
eﬃciency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation
corresponding to the year 1996 55.7% 7.0% 21.0% 11.7% 62.1% 7.2%
Proportion of high-skilled
workers: ® = 0:67 ! ® = 0:70 +12.8 -0.4 -3.2 -1.6 +2.7 +2.4
Table 3: Steady state eﬀects (deviations from the benchmark) of an increase in the proportion
of high-skilled workers.
On the other side, the higher demand for simple jobs raises the probability of hiring high-skilled
workers on this type of jobs. Their search eﬀort on the simple segment is then stimulated and
the ladder eﬀect increases. All in all, the low-skilled unemployment rate decreases and so does
the high-skilled unemployment rate (see table 3).
Aggregate technological shock
A positive disembodied technological shock (table 4 summarizes the eﬀects of a 5% increase in
z) raises marginal productivity of all factors. As capital cumulates, marginal productivity of
12For the variables expressed in percentage, deviations from the benchmark are absolute deviations; for the
variables expressed in level, deviations from the benchmark are relative deviations.
20complex jobs is even more stimulated via the capital-skill complementarity relationship. In spite
of the higher negotiated wages, demand for both types of jobs increases (due to the improved
productivity). All search eﬀorts (eht, eot, elt) are thus stimulated and unemployment rates
decrease.
Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Ladder
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect
eﬃciency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation
corresponding to the year 1996 55.7% 7.0% 21.0% 11.7% 62.1% 7.2%
Total factor productivity:
z = 1:00 ! z = 1:05 +8.2 -0.3 -2.2 -0.9 -4.8 -1.5
Table 4: Steady state eﬀects (deviations from the benchmark) of an increase in total factor
productivity.
Biased technological shock
Table 5 considers the eﬀects of an embodied technological shock. The increase in ° improves
the learning eﬃciency of the embodied technical progress production process (from each unit
of investment the economy is able to obtain more capital than before). Capital accumulation
is then accelerated, which via capital-skill complementarity stimulates the demand for complex
jobs. This, together with the rise in complex wages, results in an increased search eﬀort of
high-skilled unemployed (eht) and employed (eot) on the complex segment of the labor market.
Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Ladder
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect
eﬃciency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation
corresponding to the year 1996 55.7% 7.0% 21.0% 11.7% 62.1% 7.2%
Eﬃciency of the embodied
technical progress learning
process: ° = 0:71 ! ° = 0:74 -8.3 +0.2 +2.9 +1.1 -3.3 -1.3
Table 5: Steady state eﬀects (deviations from the benchmark) of a biased technological progress.
21The larger share of complex jobs in the production function implies a reduction in the share of
simple jobs, leading to a fall in the demand of this type of jobs as well as in their productivity.
Wages decrease and so does the search eﬀort of low-skilled unemployed (elt). Because both
categories of workers beneﬁt from simple jobs, a downturn in their demand aﬀects both types of
unemployment rates. This explains the rise in high-skilled unemployment in spite of the higher
demand for complex jobs.
3.2.1 Historical comparison
The ﬁrst row of table 6 reproduces the 1996 values of the proportion of high-skilled workers in
the labor force (®), the share of complex jobs in the production function (¹µc), the net skill-
bias13, the high- and low-skilled unemployment rates, the relative wage (wsl=wc) and the ladder
eﬀect. On the second row we display the change observed for these variables over the period
1976-1996.
The last two rows of table 6 contain the values predicted by the model for 1996 (benchmark
simulation) as well as the predicted variation between 1976 and 1996 when we introduce the
observed increase in the proportion of high-skilled workers and the observed rise in the decline
rate of the relative prices of new investment goods (we combine a variation in ® (table 3) with
a variation in ° (table 5)). The model performs well not only in reproducing the increase in
unemployment rates, but also in maintaining relative wage rigidity.
Within the theoretical framework developed in this paper the previous results are interpreted as
follows. The post-1975 period in Belgium was characterized by an increase in the proportion of
high-skilled workers in the labor force (from 21.5% to 67%), and by the rise in the decline rate of
the investment good prices with respect to consumption prices (it attained values around -20%
during the considered period). When introducing in our model both phenomena, we observe that
the acceleration of embodied technological progress (which is at the origin of the higher decline
rate in the relative prices of investment good, 1=et) over the last decades has stimulated complex
jobs creation and simple jobs destruction, via the capital-skill complementary relationship. The




t) and the relative labor force
®=(1 ¡ ®):
22Prop. of Share complex Net High-skilled Low-skilled Relative Ladder
high-skilled jobs in the Skill unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect
in the production Bias rate rate
labor force function
Actual data
1996 0.67 0.51 1.59 6.8% 20.1% 66% n.a.
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.33 +0.20 +2.1 +13.3 -0.0 n.a.
deviations
Model’s simulation
1996 0:67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2%
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8
deviations
Table 6: Skill-bias, unemployment rates, relative wages and ladder eﬀect in Belgium: comparing
actual and simulated data.
increased demand for high-skilled workers in complex jobs has been more than satisﬁed by the
large upturn in their supply. In contrast, the fall in the importance of the low-skilled labor force
has not been enough to compensate the massive destruction of simple jobs and the increased
job competition. Low-skilled unemployment raises by 13.3 percentage points.
3.3 Policy scenarios
In the previous section we tested the ability of the model to reproduce the observed variations in
Belgian unemployment rates and relative wages between 1976 and 1996. This section presents
alternative historic scenarios that would have arisen if diﬀerent welfare policies had been imple-
mented in 1996. Results are summarized in tables 7-11. We use the utility level of high-skilled
workers Uh = ln(Ch
t =®) ¡ Nsh
t D(eot)=® as an indicator of the high-skilled welfare level. In
the same way, the utility level of low-skilled, Ul = ln(Cl
t=(1 ¡ ®)), proxies the welfare level of
this type of workers. Because the utility functions are assumed to be welfare indicators, the
attention must be focused on the variation of the value function (rather than on the speciﬁc
value of the utility function). We will compare the ﬁnal welfare attained by each type of worker
under each policy context with respect to the welfare he obtained in the benchmark simulation
corresponding to 1996.
23Tables 7-11 consider ﬁve diﬀerent policy scenarios and compare them to the benchmark sim-
ulation implemented in section 3.2.1. Comparisons are implemented in a static framework,
that is, we compare the ﬁnal steady states associated to each situation without considering the
transitional dynamics.
² We start analyzing a policy measure giving to ﬁrms a proportional subsidy of 20% of
low-skilled wages in 1996 (table 7), this measure being ﬁnanced through a tax on high-
skilled wages. This target policy turns out to be beneﬁcial for both, high and low-skilled
workers, in terms of unemployment reductions (this is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Pierrard (2004) for the Belgian economy). Indeed, the subsidy increases the marginal
value the ﬁrm obtains from low-skilled workers, which stimulates the opening of simple
vacancies and, thus, search eﬀorts in the simple segment. High-skilled unemployment rates
slightly fall whereas low-skilled unemployment decreases considerably. In welfare terms,
the comparison with respect to the reference simulation, reveals that this measure mainly
favors low-skilled workers, whose welfare level clearly raises.
Prop. of Share of Net High-sk. Low-sk. Relative Ladder High-sk. Low-sk.
high-skilled complex jobs Skill unempl. unempl. wage eﬀect welfare welfare
in the in production Bias rate rate indicator indicator
labor force function
Reference Simulation
1996 0.67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2% 0.34 -0.20
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8 -0.25 -0.08
deviations
Proportional subsidy to low wages of 20% in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.80 6.8% 13.0% 71.8% 7.2% 0.33 -0.09
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.29 +2.0 +5.2 +6.3 +5.7 -0.25 +0.02
deviations
Table 7: Comparing the reference simulation with a scenario characterized by the presence, in
1996, of a proportional subsidy to low-skilled wages of 20%.
² In table 8 we assume a situation where the replacement ratio is set to 17% (the half of its
actual value) in 1976 and 1996. This measure mainly aﬀects low-skilled workers, whose
consumption is constrained by their revenue. Reducing the replacement ratio implies a
reduction in the reservation wage. This stimulates employment since ﬁrms can now oﬀer
24Prop. of Share of Net High-sk. Low-sk. Relative Ladder High-sk. Low-sk.
high-skilled complex jobs Skill unempl. unempl. wage eﬀect welfare welfare
in the in production Bias rate rate indicator indicator
labor force function
Reference Simulation
1996 0.67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2% 0.34 -0.20
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8 -0.25 -0.08
deviations
Replacement ratio of 17% in 1976 and in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.82 5.7% 12.1% 54.3% 7.0% 0.43 -0.33
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.31 +1.7 +6.6 -9.7 +5.4 -0.25 -0.19
deviations
Table 8: Comparing the reference simulation with a scenario characterized by a replacement
ratio of 17% in 1976 and 1996.
lower wages. Both unemployment rates fall, however, only high-skilled welfare is improved,
since low-skilled workers suﬀer from an important loss in their revenue that results in a
downturn of their consumption level.
² Table 9 combines the two previous policy measures. This policy mix leads to a Pareto
improving situation where unemployment levels of both types of households are lower and
their welfare is improved with respect to the reference simulation. The reduced replacement
ratio stimulates employment, leading to a decrease in unemployment rates. At the same
time, the subsidy to low-skilled wages avoids the loss in the welfare suﬀered by unskilled
workers due to the downturn in their revenue.
² Table 10 combines a reduction in the replacement ratio to 17% during 1976-1996 and a
proportional subsidy of 4% in 1996 to low-skilled consumption ﬁnanced by a tax on high-
skilled household consumption. This policy mix is also Pareto improving with respect to
the reference simulation. Unemployment rates are lower and welfare levels higher. When
comparing tables 9 and 10, we realize that subsidizing low-skilled household’s consump-
tion permits to increase their welfare by more than subsidizing their wages. However, in
this last case, unskilled unemployment rates are lower. The policy maker faces then two
possibilities:
25Prop. of Share of Net High-sk. Low-sk. Relative Ladder High-sk. Low-sk.
high-skilled complex jobs Skill unempl. unempl. wage eﬀect welfare welfare
in the in production Bias rate rate indicator indicator
labor force function
Reference Simulation
1996 0.67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2% 0.34 -0.20
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8 -0.25 -0.08
deviations
Replacement ratio of 17% in 1976 and in 1996 and a subsidy to low-skilled wages of 20% in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.83 5.5% 8.6% 66.6% 7.8% 0.40 -0.17
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.32 +1.4 +3.1 +1.3 +6.2 -0.28 -0.03
deviations
Table 9: Comparing the reference simulation with a scenario characterized by a replacement
ratio of 17% in 1976 and 1996 and a proportional subsidy to low-skilled wages of 20% in 1996.
1. Having most low-skilled workers employed but beneﬁtting from a low welfare level
(subsidy to wages),
2. or having higher low-skilled unemployment rates but subsidize their consumption so
that they can beneﬁt from a higher welfare level.
Prop. of Share of Net High-sk. Low-sk. Relative Ladder High-sk. Low-sk.
high-skilled complex jobs Skill unempl. unempl. wage eﬀect welfare welfare
in the in production Bias rate rate indicator indicator
labor force function
Reference Simulation
1996 0.67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2% 0.34 -0.20
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8 -0.25 -0.08
deviations
Replacement ratio of 17% in 1976 and in 1996 and a subsidy to low-skilled consumption of 4% in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.83 5.7% 12.1% 54.3% 7.0% 0.41 -0.09
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.31 +1.7 +6.6 -9.7 +5.4 -0.27 +0.05
deviations
Table 10: Comparing the reference simulation with a scenario characterized by a replacement
ratio of 17% in 1976 and 1996 and a subsidy to low-skilled consumption of 4% in 1996.
² In table 11 we mix a reduction in the replacement ratio to 17% during 1976-1996 with a
subsidy of 4% to low-skilled consumption and of 20% to low-skilled wages in 1996. Putting
together the three policy measures allows to improve low-skilled workers’ situation not
26only with respect to the benchmark simulation, but also with respect to the scenarios
developed in tables 9 and 10. Regarding high-skilled workers, even if they beneﬁt from
lower unemployment rates, their welfare is reduced with respect to tables 9 and 10, since
now they must ﬁnance two policy measures (their wages and their consumption are taxed).
Prop. of Share of Net High-sk. Low-sk. Relative Ladder High-sk. Low-sk.
high-skilled complex jobs Skill unempl. unempl. wage eﬀect welfare welfare
in the in production Bias rate rate indicator indicator
labor force function
Reference Simulation
1996 0.67 0.51 1.77 7.0% 21.0% 62.1% 7.2% 0.34 -0.20
1976-96 absolute +0.45 +0.32 +0.25 +2.1 +13.3 -3.4 +5.8 -0.25 -0.08
deviations
Replacement ratio of 17% in 1976 and in 1996 and a subsidy to low-skilled consumption of 4%
and to wages of 20% in 1996
1996 0.67 0.52 1.83 5.3% 8.6% 66.6% 7.8% 0.37 0.04
1976-96 +0.45 +0.32 +0.32 +1.4 +3.1 +2.7 +6.3 -0.31 +0.18
deviations
Table 11: Comparing the reference simulation with a scenario characterized by a replacement
ratio of 17% in 1976 and 1996, a subsidy to low-skilled consumption of 4% and to low-skilled
wages of 20% in 1996.
Of course, policies based on subsidies to low-skilled wages are, at best, eﬀective in the short and
medium term (see Pierrard (2004)). However, in the long-run, an increase in the proportion of
skilled in the total labor force seems more appropriate. More precisely, as suggested in various
studies (see for example Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004)) a human capital investment policy would
mitigate skill mismatch and job competition (according to CESRW (2001) only 3.7% of Belgian
unemployed workers had participated in a training programme in 2000) and it would stimulate
the appearance of technological sites that develop productive activities.
4 Conclusions
Over the last 30 years, European average unemployment rates and, especially, low-skilled un-
employment rates have followed an increasing trend. Two reasons are traditionally put forward
to explain this rise: (i) the adoption of new technologies being more demanding in skilled labor,
27combined with a rigidity in relative wages over the time, has resulted in the appearance of skill
mismatch eﬀects; (ii) aggregate technological shocks that implied a decrease in the total labor
demand have crowded out lower educated workers by higher educated ones (job competition).
Models built up to now were unable to capture simultaneously the stylized facts observed in most
European economies: the raise in the overall unemployment rate, the more important increase in
low-skilled unemployment rates and the stability in relative wages. Our paper focuses on these
issues. We build an intertemporal general equilibrium model based on Pierrard and Sneessens
(2002) but incorporating separate wage bargaining for all workers, endogenous search intensities
and endogenous skill-biased technological progress. We calibrate it on the basis of Belgian data.
The model is then simulated to test its ability to reproduce both the situation in Belgium in 1996
and the observed variation in unemployment rates and relative wages between 1976 and 1996.
Our theoretical setup performs well in both cases. Furthermore, the model is able to reproduce
the rise in unemployment rates and the relative wage rigidity through the simple introduction of
the observed change in the proportion of high-skilled workers in the labor force and the observed
decline in the relative price of investment goods. The eﬀects of various policy measures are also
analyzed.
Our model constitutes a successful attempt to take simultaneously into account the stylized
facts characterizing most European countries over the last decades. Two possible extensions
of the model seem quite natural. An immediate one concerns the introduction of endogenous
growth. A second extension, would consist in endogeneizing the evolution of the proportion of
high-skilled workers (®), so that the increase in low-skilled unemployment rates over the last 30
years could be explained by the introduction of skill-biased technological progress alone.
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